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Abstract
The disadvantages men suffer relative to women in certain dimensions are 
not always as significant as they seem. And even when they are real, they 
are not necessarily unjust. This reply to a set of six reactions to “Four Puzzles 
on Gender Inequality” offers a critical discussion of these claims. Above all, 
it questions the very idea of discussing issues of gender and justice in terms 
of “gender justice,” i.e., of justice between two categories of human beings.
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INTRODUCTION
Yes, my short speech on gender inequalities is what I think most of my 
commentators understood it to be: a modest invitation to help us better 
understand the demands of so-called gender justice and of justice more 
generally, by reflecting on some puzzles, none of them new but some of them 
sticky.1 Ana de Miguel’s superbly formulated and entertaining commentary 
was most useful in helping me see better why my initial speech could be 
misunderstood, even with the explanatory notes I subsequently added.2 I 
never read any masculinist pamphlet and do not intend to do so. But I can 
now imagine that some of what I said could have been reminiscent of some 
of what can be found in such writings and thereby suggest that I may be 
supporting their cause. Ana de Miguel can rest reassured. I do not believe, 
1 In addition to the authors of the six comments included in this volume, I am most 
grateful to Sophie Heine, Meira Levinson, Anja Topolski, and the participants in the Lovanium 
Seminar in Ethics and Public Policy (Leuven, 21 November 2014) and the Nuffield Political 
Philosophy seminar (Oxford, 1 June 2015) for the sort of comments I was hoping to trigger – 
and be enlightened by.
2 Perhaps contrary to her expectation, I particularly enjoyed de Miguel’s contribution. 
I hope she enjoyed writing it at least as much as I enjoyed reading it – and more than I did 
trying to reply to it.
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and never claimed, that it is high time we should start pitying the male 
gender, let alone that justice demands that it should be compensated for its 
many “weaknesses.” As a male member of a well-off segment of a wealthy 
society, I am only too aware of the privileges I enjoy, not only nor mainly by 
virtue of being a man, but definitely partly by virtue of being a man.3
Thus, the aim was not pro-male advocacy but philosophical clarification, 
and the point of departure, as so often for us philosophers, was a set of 
genuine puzzles, the nature of which is well captured by Paula Casal (2015: 
90-106) in the case of longevity. She is sure, she writes, “that if a random 
mutation resulted in women starting to die far ahead of men many of those 
who currently find Van Parijs’s suggestion [that men’s shorter life expectancy 
may be unjust] absurd would start listing lesser longevity as one of the 
disadvantages women suffer” (90-106). If this is the case, and holds more 
generally for at least some of the other inequalities I listed, does it not 
follow that they should count, albeit prima facie and pro tanto, as injustices 
against men? This is, at any rate, the upshot of Gina Schouten’s careful 
discussion of differential incarceration: “I tentatively conclude that men’s 
higher likelihood of incarceration is a distinct injustice to men” (3).
Schouten usefully distinguishes two ways of accommodating this 
acknowledgment. If one is willing to adopt a general metric of justice, 
gender inequalities in favor of women would reduce the overall level of 
injustice they suffer: good news for overall gender justice. If instead no 
inequality in life expectancy, homicide, or incarceration can do anything 
to offset inequalities in, say, labor income, social status, or sexual violence, 
all these inequalities simply constitute incommensurable forms of 
injustice, and if an unjust inequality develops in favor of women, this 
would not reduce but further worsen gender injustice. But we are not there 
yet, and may never get there: most of my commentators deny that the 
inequalities I listed are injustices against men.
In this response, I shall discuss several of their insightful, sometimes 
ingenious arguments. But I shall not bore the reader with a point by point 
response, in particular with a defensive inventory of the many cases in 
which I feel that a (genuinely or falsely naïve) question I was asking was 
misunderstood as a suggestion, or even as an assertion. The literary genre 
3 In particular, had I been a woman, it is most unlikely that I could have enjoyed as 
much as I did the immense privilege of combining a large family and a demanding job (see 
the section “Femmes Francqui” in my “Allocution à l’occasion de la remise du Prix Francqui 
2001,” www.uclouvain.be/8611). Possibly in a slightly weakened form, Jesús Mora’s apt remark 
can most probably be generalized: “Men with very successful careers in the hard sciences 
often have several children, successful female scientists often have no families at all, as they 
have to compete with men who have housewives that do everything for them whilst lacking one. 
So a group of well qualified women are childless or even entirely alone” (Mora 2015:).
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of my initial piece is certainly largely to blame for such over-interpretations. 
Precisely because it (uncharacteristically) abstained from making specific 
proposals, it did not need firm assertions by way of premises.4 It stopped at 
listing and motivating some questions. Asking a question leaves open the 
possibility of an answer my critics would find objectionable but does not 
amount to proposing it.
1. NO DISADVANTAGE
The general format of the question I asked was: are the apparent disadvantages 
of men that I listed unjust and, if not, why not? A first type of response to 
this sort of question consists in arguing that, once looked at closely, the 
appearance of advantage vanishes, or at least much of it does. This is the 
case for life expectancy. Paula Casal (90) usefully invites us to have a look 
at the age pyramid. If it turns out that there is little difference between the 
two sides except at the very top, it reinforces the idea that the advantage, if 
any, cannot be that great. At the limit, women simply “enjoy” some extra 
miserable years in their nineties which they may prefer not to have to endure 
(and would not if euthanasia and assisted suicide were legally and socially 
easier). Unequal numbers of years in good health would arguably be a better 
indicator of a genuine inequality of advantage, despite the unavoidable 
arbitrariness of the cut-off point between good and bad health. But this 
would still not do. 
As briefly pointed out in my piece and insightfully developed in Casal’s, 
this would overlook the asymmetric care-giving to the ageing partner. 
Even if preaching and material incentives (favorably discussed by Casal) 
could drive down the average age gap between partners to zero, even if the 
disposition (and competence) for caring for one’s ageing partner had been 
equalized across genders, even if as much as possible was outsourced (as 
also recommended by Casal), there would remain, on average, a greater 
burden for the female members of heterosexual couples, simply owing to 
their longer life expectancy. This greater burden further reduces the 
associated advantage. In order to assess what advantage is left (if any), this 
suggests designing a notion of QALY (quality-adjusted life years) that does 
not only take health into account, but also such burdens. Inequality, using 
this amended metric, might still be in favor of women, but it will definitely 
be far smaller than when measured by the raw gap in life expectancy.
4  When in other contexts I asked such incongruous questions as whether surfers 
should be fed(Van Parijs 1991), or the elderly disfranchised(Van Parijs 1998)– which some 
hard workers and some pensioners might have found offensive – I did not leave the questions 
open but argued for an answer (yes to food for surfers, no to taking away the old folk’s vote!). 
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A second interesting example of an advantage that arguably melts once 
scrutinized is provided by Jesús Mora in his stimulating discussion of 
education. While claiming that education should be regarded as a dimension 
of advantage not entirely reducible to the earning power it generates, I had 
also stressed the relevance of a paradox: “Having to work so much harder 
to be rewarded so much less is, as Van Parijs at one point suspects, one of 
the forms of compound injustice that women face” (Mora 2015: 114). Mora 
does not challenge the independent importance of education: “it is true 
that education could potentially, in some possible world, offset men’s 
economic advantage” (108). But his explanation for the paradox I stress 
makes the educational advantage enjoyed by women a necessary by-product 
of the inequality they suffer in other respects. Here is the core of the argument.
Females invest more than males in their own education because they 
anticipate that they will need it more than men for their own material 
security: “with every pregnancy and every year into the marriage, women 
become less desirable both in the love and the labor markets”(109). This 
is ref lected, he conjectures, in a material return to education that is 
systematically higher for women than for men. Women’s greater educational 
achievements“are thus symptoms of gender inequality, not signs of its 
disappearance” (114). To the extent that the higher average level of education 
is inextricably linked to disadvantages in other dimensions and hence, by 
hypothesis, would disappear in its absence, it is therefore no longer clear 
that it could be considered a separate, possibly compensating, dimension 
of advantage, or at least it is less clear than I had made it sound. This is an 
interesting conjecture, and certainly part of the story.5 Even if it is not the 
full story, it can legitimately be used to argue that the alleged advantage 
is less than it seems.
2. DISADVANTAGE JUSTIFIED
Let us now accept, as several of my commentators do, that along some 
dimensions women enjoy some advantage, though possibly smaller than 
what it looks at first sight.6 A second response then consists in arguing that 
there is nothing unjust about it. A first version of it is the “Rawlsian” 
5  Can the comparatively high rates of absenteeism, unruliness, and dropping out 
among male teenagers and their long-term consequences on the education gap be entirely 
accommodated by this conjecture? I doubt it.
6  One candidate I did not mention is strikingly documented by Casal (2015: 93): the 
probability of being killed is 2.5 times less if you are a white woman than if you are a white 
man, 9 times less if you are a black woman than if you are a black man. Does the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of the perpetrators are men prevent us from regarding men’s much 
larger probability of being murdered as a genuine and potentially unjust disadvantage?
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argument developed by Casal (2015:98) against the background of fascinating 
evolutionary conjectures: “the inequality in longevity is not unjust because 
its removal would make humans worse off.” In the human and some other 
species, the females having longer lives than males is apparently beneficial 
to the care, survival, and education of all their offspring, male and female. 
This arguably turns women’s greater longevity into an adaptive feature, 
which natural selection has preserved throughout the millennia and is still 
with us. Let us suppose that this explanation is correct. By no means does 
it follow that the inequality it explains is thereby justified. For the surplus 
of strength or resilience that enabled more mothers to steer their offspring 
into adulthood, despite the hazards of delivery and other perils, is now 
what accounts for a life expectancy of 85 rather than 80 or so. We are therefore 
talking here about one of those features which, however crucial they might 
have been in a more or less remote past, have lost their function in a deeply 
altered environment. Similarly, male aggressiveness must have been a 
handsome asset, in both individual and group selection, throughout the 
millennia in which some of our ancestors lived in rival tribes of hunters, 
but this is no justification for it in our societies.
The other challenges to the injustice of a recognized disadvantage suffered 
by men rely on the assumption that this disadvantage –in terms of longevity, 
incarceration, education, etc. –is mediated by a lifestyle or behavior pattern 
that is male-specific or at least displayed by men more often than by women. 
The phrasing of my puzzles occasionally suggested that it was essential to 
them that this propensity to behave in a certain way should be linked to 
man’s hormonal constitution. But I fully agree with convergent remarks by 
Casal (2015: 91, 98), Ottonelli (2015: 134), and Schouten (2015: 139) to the 
effect that, however big a difference this may make as regards possible 
remedies, there is no crucial difference as regards justice or responsibility 
between causal accounts in terms of genetic equipment, early socialization, 
or socially sanctioned expectations about what it is to behave as a “real 
woman” or as a “real man.” Early socialization and social sanctions are no 
more chosen by the individual men and women shaped by them than is 
their genetic equipment.
This being clarified, let us consider the suggestion that women’s greater 
longevity is (prima facie and pro tanto) unjust, against the background of 
the factual assumption that men are predisposed, either by their genetic 
equipment or by their social environment, to a behavior pattern that will 
inflict on them a genuine disadvantage relative to women, by costing them 
on average several years of valuable life. Casal formulates two “liberal-
egalitarian” challenges to this disadvantage constituting an injustice, one 
inspired by Tim Scanlon, the other by Ronald Dworkin. 
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According to the “Scanlonian” challenge, once society has done enough, 
i.e., once men, under appropriate circumstances, have been sufficiently 
warned that some behavior pattern can have detrimental consequences for 
them, there is no injustice involved if they persist in behaving in a damaging 
way. One serious problem with this challenge is that making people aware 
of the consequences of their choices does not get rid of the underlying 
unchosen disadvantage, as well characterized by Schouten in the case of 
incarceration: “Whatever configuration of social and natural causes are at 
work, they presumably make males likelier to be incarcerated because 
they make it more difficult for males than for females to avoid the kinds of 
behaviors that lead to incarceration” (Schouten 2015: 139). Much of the 
material injustice suffered by women is of fundamentally the same nature: 
“to make the counter-gender-typical choice of prioritizing paid labor, the 
average woman will have to overcome either ingrained social norms or a 
natural predisposition to prioritize others’ needs for care, or both; and she 
will have to pay the costs of violating social norms.” (141) Whether or not 
men or women are being properly warned about the consequences of 
following their natural or social inclinations, “in both cases, the inequalities 
in the background against which the relevant choice is made are not chosen; 
and in both cases, the relevant choice is harmful to the chooser” (142). If 
appropriate warnings are deemed sufficient to nullify the alleged injustice 
suffered by men as a result of their choices, the door is wide open for this 
sort of excessively easy justification of inequalities suffered by women.
The “Dworkinian” challenge presented by Casal deactivates the imputation 
of injustice by focusing on what the alleged victims of injustice identify with, 
rather than the warning given to them. There is no injustice involved (let 
alone compensation due), so the challenge goes, if men identify with the 
behavioral pattern that triggers the disadvantage. To the extent that they 
identify with it, such a behavioral pattern is not a handicap, like an addiction, 
which they would prefer to be without. It is part of their identity, like a 
religion which they may never have chosen – if they grew up within it – but 
which they embrace. The test proposed by Dworkin in order to determine 
what counts as an injustice calling for redress or compensation consists in 
a counterfactual insurance device, where people are supposed to know 
their ambitions but not their endowments. When performing this exercise, 
men “would have insured against illness or disability but not against being 
male” (Casal 2015: 100).
The trouble with this challenge is that nothing prevents, in Dworkin’s 
device, taking male, or female, or atheist, or Muslim, as part of what one 
identifies with, and hence of one’s ambitions (like wanting to be a pianist 
or a gardener), while insuring against how costly it will prove to be. This 
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presupposes that one can dissociate being male from the cost it involves 
(here in years of life), and there is no reason why such dissociation should 
be ruled out, unless the cost is what one identifies with (as some may do 
with fasting).If one did rule it out, as implied by Casal’s Dworkinian 
argument, it is true that one could no longer make sense of the injustice of 
a number of disadvantages suffered by men, but equally of many putatively 
unjust disadvantages suffered by women. 
“Some may worry,” Casal (100) notes, “that this Dworkinian use of self-
identification as a criterion for justifying compensations may not always 
favor feminist demands.” Indeed they should worry. Spending plenty of 
time with their children is part of an identity some women embrace, and if 
the implied cost in foregone (current and future) income could not be 
dissociated from what they identify with, they would have no “Dworkinian” 
complaint of justice against the income inequality stemming from this 
source, just as men, for analogous reasons, would not have a “Dworkinian” 
claim of justice against inequality in life expectancy stemming from a 
lifestyle with which they identify. If we are not to miss a big part of the 
injustice inf licted to women, it would therefore seem wise to allow a 
dissociation between gender-specific behavioral patterns and their cost, at 
the price of acknowledging the failure of the “Dworkinian” challenge.
Are we then forced to admit that any disadvantage – whether higher 
chance of being killed or more expensive consumption – stemming from 
men’s specific lifestyle or pattern of behavior is, albeit prima facie and pro 
tanto, unjust, given that it is causally linked to the unchosen fact that they 
are men? We are not. Clearly, any plausible conception of justice must 
manage to make a distinction between a handicap that justifies redress or 
compensation and preferences the cost of which need to be borne by those 
who have them. This point is forcefully made by de Miguel (2015: 154) in 
the case of prostitution: “It is also very strange to say that somebody is to 
some degree disabled in an injustice-involving sense merely because they 
have, or are more likely to have, a preference. The same is true if the 
preference is a passion, for instance for the sea or the snow, that might kill 
you in some circumstances. The word ‘handicap’ suggests something 
stronger than the frustration of a mere preference, the existence of an 
unmet need.” Thirst, she argues, can qualify as a need, but not the preference 
for having it satisfied in a fancy way. “And the desire for sex is like this ‘thirst-
thing’ for most men. They love having it, and so long as they are not 
handicapped in other ways, and so still have hands, relief is simple, instant, 
and gratis” (de Miguel 2015: 153). Any sensible conception of justice must 
make room for a distinction of this sort. In the following section, I shall drop 
the ad hominem (or ad feminam) posture I have adopted so far (as well as in 
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my initial piece) and sketch how the conception of justice to which I subscribe 
myself tries to accommodate this important distinction and to address other 
key issues raised in the comments.
3. SOCIAL JUSTICE AS REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL
Ottonelli (2015: 126) finds it puzzling that I assumed as unproblematic 
“some version of equality of opportunity for welfare or resources,” which 
fails to capture key aspects of the injustice suffered by women: “for example, 
women’s higher unemployment rates, lower income, and greater hardship 
resulting from divorce,” which should be “taken as signs of the domination, 
oppression, and exploitation that women suffer in our society.” She is right to 
complain. These aspects need to be taken on board, and the conception 
of justice I subscribe to can accommodate them, I believe, far better than 
the vague notion of equality of advantage which I have been relying on so 
far for the sake of the argument(s).
This conception can be captured in the slogan “Real freedom for all.” It 
essentially requires empowering as much as is sustainable those with least 
power to shape their lives. And it is leading me to advocate, along with Carole 
Pateman, for example, repeatedly cited by de Miguel (2015: 153, 158), and 
along with many others, an unconditional basic income.7 For the sake of 
justice as real freedom for all, this unconditional income should be pitched 
at the highest sustainable level, part of it being given in the form of quality 
education, health care, and a sane environment, in addition to an unflinching 
protection of physical integrity. However they are funded, the introduction 
of an unconditional basic income and the rise of its relative level are bound 
to involve a net redistribution from men to women and, more importantly, 
a greater expansion of life options for women than for men.
It should not take too much effort to imagine, in particular, what difference 
the highest sustainable unconditional basic income would make to the 
prostitutes described by de Miguel (153-6). Its prospective effect is not 
mainly to increase their purchasing power. It is above all to increase their 
bargaining power on all fronts by multiplying exit options. Nor should it 
take much effort to show that such a conception of justice is more than 
compatible with Ottonelli’s (130) view that “our treatment of male’s 
unfortunate hormonal constitution represents indeed a rare case of over-
accommodation of an impairing disability”or with de Miguel’s (158) call 
for putting an end to “overindulgence in the male itch.” Moreover, if it is 
7 See Pateman (2006), Murray &Pateman eds. (2012), and, for recent discussion of 
the connection between gender inequalities and basic income, McLean (2015) and Elgarte 
(in progress).
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the case that “an overwhelming presence of men in dangerous, difficult, 
and hazardous jobs […] causes countless episodes of killings, torture, physical 
aggression, humiliation, maltreatment, medical malpractice, physical injuries, 
and deaths by negligence” (Ottonelli 132), then there is no doubt that justice 
as real freedom for all would command that an end should immediately be 
put to this overwhelming presence of men. There may well exist sound 
evolutionary explanations for male-specific dispositions that generate 
despicable behavior, but this can never amount to justifying giving the latter 
free rein.
This being said, it is of course intrinsic to a conception of justice that 
adopts freedom as its distribuendum that it should not erect into an ideal 
the achievement of equal average scores – or of an equal grand total score 
– by all categories of human beings for variables expected to be affected by 
the latter’s free choices. The monitoring of gender gaps, in particular, can 
play a useful role in locating forms of discrimination or intimidation that 
hinder the pursuit of justice as real freedom for all. But the existence of 
significant gender gaps in terms of expected lifetime earnings or quality-
adjusted life years, for example, is not, as such, decisive evidence that 
injustice is being perpetrated. The choices made by men and women that 
lead to such gender gaps are not made in an angelic vacuum. They are made 
by people enabled and inclined by their genes to do, on average, different 
things or do them differently, depending on whether they are men or 
women. These human beings also grew up and currently live in immediate 
surroundings and wider societies that tend to expect different things from 
them depending on their gender. Men and women may or may not identify 
with these expectations. A just society is not one in which all gender-specific 
capabilities and expectations have been eradicated. It is one whose institutions 
allocate resources in such a way that those women and men with least real 
freedom are made as really free as possible to live as they might wish to live, 
including of course by refusing to fulfill the existing gender-specific social 
expectations.
So far (perhaps) so good. But how can such a conception of justice make 
room for a distinction between, on the one hand, handicaps for which it is 
fair that one should be compensated and, on the other hand, preferences 
the consequences of which one should bear? Quite simple – in principle. As 
mentioned above, part of the highest sustainable unconditional basic 
income is to be given in kind, in particular, in the form of a health care 
package. How big this component should be, and what it should cover and 
how,is to be determined, in Dworkinian fashion, through a thought experiment 
that requires us to hide behind a veil of ignorance those of our features – 
including our gender –that affect the probability of our suffering disabilities 
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and other health impairments in a very broad sense.8 The resulting just 
health care system can safely be expected to cover,for example, pregnancy, 
abortion, contraception, perhaps female and male infertility. It may well 
accommodate a dependency insurance that reduces the chance of elderly 
people needing to rely heavily on their close relatives. But I would not count 
on its including prostitution vouchers.
4. AGAINST CATEGORICAL JUSTICE
This is not the place to further spell out the content and implications of social 
justice as real freedom for all, except to further clarify, using illustrations 
provided in the comments, in what sense it is incompatible with the very idea 
of gender justice(and, more generally, of category-based justice), and why 
this matters. 
To illustrate the incompatibility, let us first return to longevity. In her 
insightful discussion, Casal (2015: 94) notes: “It would not make sense to 
compensate men who avoid all life-shortening behavior and are thus likely 
to live long. For then there will be nothing they have to be compensated 
for[…]. But it would make even less sense to compensate individuals who, 
despite engaging in all the life-shortening gendered behavior, still escape 
the fate for which they are supposed to be compensated.” Quite right. Let 
us radicalize the example by considering two fictitious situations. In 
situation A, all females die at 85 and all males at 80. In situation B, everyone 
dies at 85 except for one baby boy out of seventeen, who dies shortly after 
birth, thereby giving males a life expectancy at birth of 80. Surely, it would 
be absurd to count this lower life expectancy at birth as a disadvantage for 
the surviving males. If anything, it should count as an advantage, since the 
form taken by this shorter life expectancy has made them scarcer relative 
to females in the mating segment of their lives. But this is not only about 
just-born babies. Suppose that the whole of the gender gap in life expectancy 
was the result of a higher probability of males dying before forty. There would 
be no longevity disadvantage in being a male over forty. This should suffice 
to convey the intuition of why the very idea of talking about justice between 
statistical categories, gender or otherwise, is problematic. Within the 
framework of justice as real freedom for all, in particular, categorical justice 
makes no sense.
8 As explained in Van Parijs (2009: section 4), I now believe that this is a better way 
of accommodating what is usually captured by the preference/needs distinction than the 
criterion of “undominated diversity” proposed for this purpose in Van Parijs (1995: chapter 
3) and mentioned by Casal (2015: 9).
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To illustrate the real-life relevance of this rejection of categorical justice, 
let us return to Mora’s stimulating discussion of women’s educational advantage. 
I liked the compact summary of his analysis:“female educational efforts, far 
from signaling the arrival of equality, are the knotted rope women use to 
escape the flames of discrimination, domestic and workplace exploitation, 
and poverty” (Mora 2015: 110). In the same vein, Mora points out that female 
higher educational efforts are worth pursuing because it is women’s “protection, 
and perhaps the only one, against being short-changed at work and at home,” 
and that higher education is the “irreplaceable tool for them to achieve levels 
of employability similar to men’s” (110). One conclusion one may be tempted 
to draw from this is that promoting the education of women, and in particular 
their access to higher education, is the only serious hope for addressing the 
injustice suffered by women. But I am sure that Mora will want to resist this 
conclusion. For what about the countless women who, even in the best 
circumstances, will never go into higher education? Surely, the injustice 
they suffer is in no way diminished as a result of other women escaping the 
flames of discrimination and exploitation.
Justice as real freedom for all does not care about justice between genders, 
or any other categories, taken globally. It demands that prior attention be given 
to the real freedom, to the bargaining power of the worse-off, most likely women 
and men who never attended and will never attend higher education. 
Therefore, the privileges, big and small, enjoyed by those who do get access 
to higher levels of education can be justified only by the extent to which they 
contribute to the real freedom of those who do not. The pursuit of social 
justice as real freedom for all may require policy tools that are categorical, in 
particular gender-specific. But social justice and injustice themselves must 
be understood as obtaining or failing to obtain between individuals. One 
of the great contributions of feminism to the thinking about justice is to 
have made it more individualistic by blowing up the black box of the 
household and exposing intra-household injustice. Thinking about justice 
as applying between categories is no better than thinking about justice as 
applying between households.
5. POLITICAL INEQUALITY
I have said nothing so far about one inequality I mentioned as a potential 
injustice suffered by men, the fact that they systematically form a political 
minority. As well explained by Pierre-Étienne Vandamme (2015), this case 
is quite different from the other ones. The inequality, here, is not as such an 
advantage, but only a potential source of advantages. And it is, moreover, a 
source that is most unlikely to ever be activated. 
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Vandamme does not question the existence of a solid majority of female 
voters in mature democracies. He even mentions the stunning figure of seven 
million more women than men voting at recent US presidential elections. 
However, he does challenge the expectation that this gap will widen as a 
consequence of the widening gap between the educational level of women 
and men. Apparently, with some exceptions such as the US and Switzerland, 
the positive correlation between education level and turnout is vanishing 
in mature democracies. By contrast, the positive correlation between age 
and turnout remains firm, even though one cannot expect the ageing of the 
population to deepen the gap in life expectancy, nor therefore the male-female 
imbalance in either the electorate or the turnout.
The key issue, however, is whether belonging to a numerical majority – 
whether racial, religious, linguistic, professional, whatever – is a feature that 
matters as regards justice. Clearly, no procedural injustice is involved: one 
person, one potential vote. Hence, Vandamme (2015: 120) rightly argues that 
injustice can only arise from a numerical imbalance if the more numerous 
group uses its electoral power to “turn this numerical advantage into 
a substantial injustice.” One can imagine two situations in which this 
is unlikely to happen. One is a perfect deliberative democracy, in which 
all voters are guided by an impartial conception of justice or of the common 
good, not by their personal interests. The other situation is that of a democracy 
that is less than perfect in this sense, but in which the interests of majority 
and minority are so closely intertwined that the majority could not pursue 
its own interests without also pursuing those of the minority. If we diverge 
significantly from either of these situations, a serious risk of injustice arises, 
unless special constitutional or customary constraints are introduced in order 
to protect the minority, such as veto powers, guaranteed representation, 
quotas, and parity rules in executives and in legislative assemblies.
Why do such protections seem to make obvious sense in the case of 
Flemings versus Walloons, Shiites versus Sunnites, etc. and not in the case 
of women versus men? The reason is not that the categories of women and 
men are each very heterogeneous. So are the other majority/minority 
pairs. The difference, I submit, lies elsewhere. If every Fleming needed 
a Walloon, or each Shiite a Sunnite, in order to procreate, if each of them 
was born from a mixed couple and if most of them cohabited in mixed 
households and ended up with offspring from either group, their interests 
on most issues would converge sufficiently for the risk of a tyranny of the 
majority to be very limited, far more limited at any rate than if none of this 
were the case. But this is exactly the situation that obtains between men 
and women. There is a (quasi) unavoidable territorial and personal closeness 
between genders that makes for a far more systematic convergence of interests 
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than in the case of ethnic categories. Not a total convergence, needless to 
say, but one sufficient for no protective veto power to make sense, however 
large the gap between female and male voting power ever becomes, especially 
if, next to the convergence of interest, public deliberation plays some of its 
civilizing, justice-seeking role. 
For the time being, anyway, the danger of misuse of political power is 
rather coming from the other side. Vandamme rightly stresses that political 
power does not reduce to electoral power. Whether because of the misplaced 
celebration of “leadership” qualities denounced by Ottonelli (2015: 130) 
or because of the unequal distribution of relevant resources, more men than 
women tend to be involved in forms of political participation more demanding 
and more consequential than casting a vote at distant intervals. Hence, if 
political power is being misused in those areas in which the interests of men 
and women systematically diverge, it is more likely to be at the expense of 
women rather than in their favor, for example, because platforms and policies 
are surreptitiously concocted and packaged in gender-biased fashion. This 
is why the presence of women at all levels of public (and private) power is 
so important. Not for the sake of equalizing the chance of access to top 
positions for the select few, but in order to prevent the specific interests of 
women of all social classes being systematically under appreciated or completely 
overlooked. This is about political power, though not the power to impose 
one’s will through majoritarian voting, rather the power to make problems 
visible and intelligible in time, and to create the conditions for the adoption 
and implementation of solutions that can be regarded as fair by all women 
no less than by all men.
EPILOGUE
“Why not go to a disability conference to talk about the four downsides of 
being able-bodied?” de Miguel (2015: 159) asks. Good question. No, I would 
not do it. Why then did I agree to do something analogous on gender 
inequality? No doubt because I believe that there are some crucial 
differences between the case of gender and that of disability. And also 
because in this case I was specifically asked to raise some philosophical 
questions on gender by someone I like and whose action I wanted to 
support. Given the short time at my disposal, my first puzzles were the way 
I thought I could satisfy the request most effectively. This turned out to be 
a mistake in the short run, but perhaps not in the longer run, judging by the 
discussion in this volume, very instructive and clarifying certainly for me 
and probably for others too.
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Nevertheless, as Schouten (2016: 137) puts it, “we might lament the 
opportunity costs of theorizing alleged injustices against men when women 
continue to be victimized by pervasive structural injustices, and worry that 
such theorizing will slow progress toward women’s equality.” I entirely share 
the underlying conviction that concern with real-life injustices should be at 
the core of much of our work as political philosophers. It has certainly been 
at the core of mine. Asking, as I did, some seemingly incongruous questions 
was certainly not intended to “slow progress toward women’s equality” (137). 
As should be clear by now, it was meant to invite more careful thinking about 
the relation between gender and justice in a way that should have some 
relevance to the public debate on these issues, and hence also to real-life 
gender-related public policy.
In particular, I wanted to highlight the possibility that gender justice, 
understood as justice between two categories, may be the wrong way to 
think about justice and gender –a point that, in different ways, both Casal 
(2015: 91) and de Miguel (2015: 159-60), also touch upon. To illustrate the 
relevance of this challenge to real life, consider the Gender Equality Index 
developed by the Vilnius-based European Institute for Gender Equality.9 
Such a composite index aggregates a number of variables each of which 
reflects some aspect of gender inequality, for example, the male-female 
gaps in earnings, in rates of participation in the labor market, in proportions 
of tertiary education graduates, in life expectancy or in parliamentary 
representation. When collected in a reliable and comparable way, the data 
sets used as inputs are extremely useful for the sake of assessing a country’s 
performance and guiding its policies. But the categorical-justice approach 
such a composite index encourages and the arbitrary weights on which it 
relies are, in my view, obstacles rather than tools in the effort to guide and 
design public policies in the service of social justice.
In order to engage with real issues, we philosophers often have to 
venture outside our tiny field of professional expertise. No problem as 
such: this is both our right and our duty. But it inevitably involves taking 
the risk of saying or suggesting things that turn out to be wrong, and hence 
of being corrected by colleagues who know more about the subject or have 
thought more about it. This is part of the never-ending attempt to give a 
coherent picture of what we can and must be heading for, to address the 
objections this picture may give rise to, and to correct it whenever needed. 
I am most grateful to my commentators and especially to Paula Casal, who 
master-minded this symposium, for having helped me along on this – 
sometimes bumpy – road.
9 Gender Equality Index 2012, European Institute for Gender Equality, https://www.
eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/genderequality-index, consulted March 2016.
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